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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
DENNIS J. HARVEY by his
guardian ad litem, Charles
R. Harvey,
Plain tiff-A pellan t
vs.
DEAN J. HADFIELD, d/b/a
HADFIELD'S
Defendant-Respondent

Case No.
No. 9597

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by a minor through his guardian ad
litem to disaffirm a contract entered into during his
minority.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment in
quasi-specific performance for the defendant the plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the judgment and a judgment in his favor as a matter of law.
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THE FACTS
The plaintiff became 19 years of age on the 13th day
of October, 1959. He was going to college in Logan and
his parents were living in Blanding. He quit school and
commenced working for wages in Brigham City about
the 15th day of October, but continued to live at the
same location that he had lived at while attending school.
He had lived with his parents at all times previous except while attending college and was partially supported
by them while in school. In the latter part of October
the Plaintiff went to defendants business establishment
looking for a trailer house which he wanted for his
contemplated marriage and had a conversation with the
defendent \vith regard to a particular trailer. Plaintiff
informed defendant that he was a minor and 19 years of
age. Defendant told him that he would have to have
his father's signature to get financing through defendant.
Plaintiff told defendant he thought he could arrange financing else\Yhere, and that he had enough money to
give the defendant $1,000.00 as a down payn1ent but that
it would take him son1e time to get it. The plaintiff obtained the first $500.00 and paid it to the defendant on
Novemher 6th as evidenred hy Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3,
and paid the .other $500.00 to the defendant on the 13th
of Nove1nher, as evidenced hy plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4.
The defendant had not obtained financing at the time of
this last payu1ent and "Tent to the Fir~t National Bank
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of Logan in an attempt to finance. He signed a finan<'ing contraet at the bank (plaintiffs Exhibit No.1) which
the bank finally refused to accept because of the defendants minority and because his father would not
sign \\·ith him. The trailer house was placed by defendant
on a lot in defendants trailer court adjacent to the sales
office and the plaintiff was credited with 2 months free
rent. Prior to the placement on the lot the plaintiff was
given a key to the trailer so he could put shelves in the
unit, which he did, but the defendant never lived in the
unit and the utilities were never cornpletely hooked up.
The plaintiff was informed by the bank that they
would not finance without his father's signature and he
took the contract with him to Blanding over the Thanksgiving holidays and discussed the matter with his father
for the first time. His father refu.sed to sign the contract
and instructed the plaintiff to get his money back. The
plaintiff returned to Logan and informed the defendant
that he could not get his father to sign with him and demanded his money back. The defendant told plaintiff
that he didn't have the money any more and couldn't
return it. The plaintiff told defendant that his plans
had changed and that he might want a trailer in the
spring and asked the defendant to sign a statement that
he would give plaintiff his money back plus interest or
credit on another trailer in the spring. The defendant refused to sign .such a statement but dictated plaintiffs
Exhibit X o. 2, "·hich the plaintiff typed and both parties
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signed. This statement gave plaintiff $1,000 credit plus
interest on the purchase of a trailer of his choice and released the trailer in question for sale by defendants. Pursuant to the provisions of Exhibit No. 2 the defendant
sold the trailer to another party. Shortly after the 1st of
February 1960 the defendant received the letter marked
plaintiffs Exhibit No. 7, disaffirming the contract under
which the defendant held plaintiffs $1,000.00. The plaintiff married in the late spring and set up his residence in
Arizona. This action was commenced on June 16, 1960
for the recovery of the money plus interest.
POINT NO.1: THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING
(FINDING NO. 6) THAT THE PR0, ISIONS OF
SECTION 15-2-3 U.C.A. 1953 ARE APPLICABLE
TO THIS CASE AND PREVENT AND ESTOP
PLAINTIFF FROM DISAFFIRMING THE CON7

TRACT.
The record reveals that the defendant in fact knew at
all times during the negotiations and transaction in
quetion that the plaintiff was a minor. The testimony
of the Plaintiff (page 92 of Record, line 22.) and that
of the defendant (page 46 lines 10-22) n1akes it unquestionable that the defendant wa.s clearly inforn1ed by
plaintiff of his age and status as a 1ninor. In fact, the
defendant told plaintiff he 'vuold have to make other
arrangementE' for his financing unless he could get an
adult to sign "'"ith him (page 46-20 to 25).
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Seetion 15-2-3

r·.c ..A.

reads

a~

follows:

''Limitation on right to disaffirm.-- No contract
can be thus disaffir1ned in cases where, on account of the~ minor's own misrepresentations as
to his 1najority or from his having engaged in
business as an adult, the other part!~ had good
reason to believe the minor capable of contracting."
Under this stature if the person dealing \vith the minor
is informed directly by the minor of his age there can be
no estoppel, and the above cited section has no application. This conclusion was reached in numerous decisions
dealing with identical statutes, and there are no decisions to the contrary. This is a well settled and firmly
established principle. In the case of ~rcClure ~rotor Co.
v. Irwin, 21 P 2nd 403 a statutory estoppel provision
identical to the Utah Statute was construed by the Kan~a~ court in the following language:
"Notwithstanding there was evidence that
Harold Irwin had been engaged in business for
himself, it was clearly shown that when he purchased the cars from the plaintiff he not only did
not misrepresent his age, he affirmativly showed
he \vas a minor, and with that knowledge at hand
the plaintiff knew that he was not legally capable
of contracting; that the only wa!~ he could be
legally capable of contracting \vould be through
having his rights of majority conferred upon him,
and no one claims that was done, or, if it \vas
done, the burden was on the plaintiff to sho\v it.
The plaintiff, aware of the fact that the defendant
\\~as a minor, dealt with him and kne\v as a minor
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he had a right to disaffirm, which he did in a
somewhat belated manner. Under the circun1stances, it cannot be said, as a 1natter of law, that
the plaintiff had good reason to believe the minor
capable of contracting; The converse is true that~
when plaintiff knew of defendant's minority, it
could have no good reason to believe him cabable
of contracting.''
Similarly, in Snodderly v. Brotherton, 21 P 2nd 1036
the Washington court reached the same result in construing an identical estopple statute:
''It will be noted from a reading of this section of the statute that, in order to prevent disaffirmance, there must be either an actual mi~
representation of age by the minor, or else an
implied misrepresentation arising from his having engaged in business, whereby the other party
has good reason to believe him to be capable of
contracting. There is not a syliable of testi1nony
nor a shred of evidence in the record that respondent actually misrepresented his age. ,,,._ P n1ay
therefore disregard that element. ,,~hether respondent's former business activities and enterprises were such as to lead one generally to believe hin1 capable of contracting~ is inunaterial
in this case because the court in its memoranum
opinion and also in its finding of fart, specifically
found that Stradley, the agent of appellant knew
that respondent \\Tas not then of age.''
It is clear from these decisions that \\'"here the minor
informs the person \Yith \Yhoin he deals that he i.:; a Injnor
the provision~ of said P~toppel statute do not apply, and
P~peciall~· \\·here the defendant told the plaintiff that he
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could not finance him on the balance because of his minority, thus acknowledging that he knew that the defendants
eaparity to contract was limited.
I quote from defendant's testimony as follows (P. 46
lines 10-22).
Q. Was there any discussion during any of
these conversations concerning the age of Dennis
Harvey~

A. Yes.

Q. And what was the nature of the conversv.tion
as it related to the age of Dennis Harvey; ar~d if
you recall the general sequence of the conversations, was it in the early part of your discussions with him or the latter part of your discussions with him that the matter of age came up~
A. I say the earlier part.
Q. What was said between you as regards the

matter of

age~

A. Well, he told me his age. I think it was nineteen, nineteen or twenty. At least I know he was
under 21, and I told him there would be a problem
of financing.
The record is replete with acknowledgments by the
defendant that he knew the plaintiff was a minor at all
times.
In view of the above discussion it is irrelevent as to
"'"hether or not the defendant was ''engaged in business
as an adult" within the maining of the statute in question; however, even if it were to be determined to be
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relevant the court made no finding of fact which would
justify such a conclusion, nor would such a finding have
been warranted by the evidence if it had been made. rrhe
type of evidence necessary to .;.;ustain such a finding is
discussed in the leading case of Friar v. Rae - Chandler
Co. 185 N. W. 32, (Iowa), construing a substantially
Rimilar estoppel statute from which I quote as follo,vs:
The words ''engaging in business'' within the
meaning of section 3190 of the Code are difficult
to precise definition. They certainly mean something more than working for wages upon a farm
or in a factory or as a chauffer or clerking in
a store and many similar occupations. These employments are as common to minors as to adults,
and there is nothing in the nature or character
thereof to indicate that a minor thus employed
is engaged in business as an adult. These occupations are not peculiar to adults. . . . . . . .
One engaged as chauffer, as a laborer, clerk,
or stock salesman, although upon a commission
basis, is not engaged in an independent business
in which he assun1e8 to pay obligations growing
out of and peculiar to the business. One engaged in busine8~ as an adult makes contract~
and a.ssu1nes obligation~ 'Yhich are binding a~
a 1natter of course and "~ithout question as to
his right to do ~o. ',
There is no evidence of plaintiffs having engaged in
busines~ as an adult or even having represented that
he had done business as an adult 'Yithin the 1neaning of
the statute. The strongP.3t evidence on the point is that
the plaintiff '· "Tas 'Yorking in Brigham.''
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POIN'"f NO.2: THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING
(FINDING NO. 5) THAT THERE WAS ANY CONTRl\CT TO BE DISAFFIRMED EXCEPT EXHIBIT
KO. :2.
For the reasons stated under the discussions on point
No. 3, the so-called contract or Exhibit No. 1 never was
executed and never became a contract which left only
Exhibit No. 2 as a "'contract" .
..:\ssurning, however, that Exhibit No. 1, were to be
eons trued as a contract then Exhibit No. 2 constituted
a novation contract. It extinguished all prior contracts,
if an~~ existed, pertaining to the conditions of defendants right to retain the $1,000 plus interest. A
disaffirmance thereof would constitute a complete disaffirmance of any agreement under which the defendant claimed to hold the money.
1..-nder all prior writings and the testimony of both
the plaintiff and defendant, there had been, prior to
the (lXerution of No. 2, an understanding concerning the
purchase of a specific trailer for a specific price. rrhe
execution of Exhibit 2 completely changed all prior understanding·~ and the defendant was authorized to sell
the specific trailer house and the plaintiff was given
full credit on the defendants books for the $1,000.00
plus interest and was to select an entirely different
trailer 6 months later.
The defendant actually sold the trailer home in quesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion, pursuant to the release contained in Exhibit No.

2. The court held that even though Exhibit No. 2
had been executed, that a prior contract pertaining to
the $1,000.00 which was inconsistant with Exhibit No. 2
was still in force and effect and needed specific disaffirmnace.
The essentials of a novation as stated in 66 C.J.S.
p. 683 are as follows:
''The courts have frequently enumerated the
essential requisites of a novation as (1) a previously valid obligation: (2) the extinguishment
of the old contract; (3) and the validity of a
new one.''
These elements are inherent in this transaction as
giving validity to Exhibit No. 2 as a complete novation
contract even if prior writings constituted a contract
and we deny that any did. Thus, there was only one contract to be disaffirmed, Exhibit No. 2, either upon the
theory that it was the only contract or upon the theory
that it was a novation of a previous contract.
POINT NO. 3: THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING
(FINDING NO. 1) THAT EXHIBIT NO. 1 CONSTITUTED A CONDITIONAL SALES CONTR.A.CT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT AND ERRED IN FINDING THAT PURSUANT TO SAID CONTRACT THE PLAINTIFF
PAID $1,000.00.
Exhibit No. 1, both on its face and under the undisputed testimony, is no more than an application for
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finan~ing

111ade to the First National Bank of Logan,
whieh 'va~ never approved nor accepted by said bank
hP~ause the plaintiff \\'US a Ininor and could not get his
fathPr to sign with him. The defendant clearly Btates
that he could not finance him through any of his
sources 'vithout the father's signature (Page 53
lines 1-l:-2;)). The record is quite clear on the point
that if the bank had accepted the signature of the plaintiff alone and disbursed the money to Hadfields unde-r
the terms of Exhibit No. 1 then it might be said that
Exhibit No. 1 constituted a contract. Ho,vever, any effect that might have otherwise been given to~ said exhibit
as a contract 'vas nullified by the bankB specifically rejecting it-plaintiff was unable to get financing. Said
Exhibit can not be said to be any more than an offer
to the bank 'vhich offer was specifically rejected by
the bank according to the undisputed testimony and the
Courts finding No. 4. If Exhibit No. 1 is to be held to be
a binding contract between the parties then the defendant should be required to con1e up 'vith the financing 1noney, but this he specifically refused to do 'vithout the fathers signature. The so-called contract wa3
never seen by defendant until after the bank had refused financing and then the plaintiff showed it to
him when he told him he wanted his money back. There
is not one shred of evidence in the record wherein the
defendant claims exhibit No. 1 to be a contract or that
he

"'a~

'villing to abide by the terms thereof 'vhich
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would have entailed his financing the trailer without
plaintiffs father's signature. In any event exhibit No.
2 would have constituted a complete novation of Exhibit No. 1, or any other prior writing concerning the
$1,000.00 for the reasons set forth in argument on
Point No. 2.
No money was paid pursuant to the terms of Exhibit
No. 1. Exhibit No. 1 was signed at the bank on the
24th day of November, 1959 and the money was all
deposited with the defendant prior thereto in two installments, of $500.00 each, the first on November 6th,
(see exhibit 3,) and the second on November 13 (see
exhibit 4). The record is indisputable that there were
no specific arrangements made for financing at the
time of the deposit of the money with the defendant.
POINT NO. 4: THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING
(FINDING NO.5) THAT THE PLAINTIFF NEVER
DISAFFIRMED THE FIRST CONTRACT AND ERRED IN :B,AILING TO FIND AS A ~fATTER OF
LAW THAT THE PLAINTIFF DISAFFIR:\fED
ANY CONTRACT UNDER WHICH THE DEFENDANT CLAIMED TO HOLD THE PLAIXTIFF'S
$1,000.00.
This court has announced the ground rule as to the
manner and form required for a disaffirmance of a
contract by a minor in the case of l\f erchants Credit
Bureau v. Kaoru Akiyama 230 P. 1017 in which case
the minor was defending himself against an action on
a note he had co-signed "Thile a minor but \\Thich action
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'vas counnenced against hiin after he attained his majorit~·.

In his ans,ver for the first time he raised the

<lefensP of

minorit~·

and disaffirmed.

In connection

'vith the Inode of disaffirtnance the court stated as follows at page 1018:
It is contended on the part of plaintiff that,
in vie'v that Kaoru "ras of age when his answer
was filed, that did not amount to a disaffirmance. We cannot agree with that contention, in
view of the fact that no particular fornt of disaffirmance is necessary, and undoubtedly ~[r.
Sneddon, as attorney, if not as guardian ad limem, could disaffirm precisely as he did. ~fore
over, there is nothing in the record to show any
fact or circumstance 1ohatever from which any
one could assume that J( aoru intended to b~
bo1tnd by the note in question. (Emphasis sup
plied).
In the instant case the minor or his guardian have
taken all of the affirmative steps in causing the letter
of disaffirmance to be written by their attorneys in
Southern lTtah (P. Exhibit No. 7), and by the bringing
of an action to recover the $1,000.00 plus interest on
the basis of a disaffirmance. To hold otherwise would
require the most technical of terminology in effecting
a dissaffirmance. The disaffirmance is sufficiently specific even under a highly technical construction.
POINT NO. 5: THE COL'"RT ERRED IN FINDIXG
(FINDIXG NO. 7) THAT THE DEFEND_._\NT \\T-LL\S
Ol'"T OF POCKET $1,000.00 BY REASON OF THE
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PLAINTIFF'S ACTS DUE TO DEPRECIATION
AND LOSS OF SALE VALUE.
Under the case of Merchants Credit Bureau v. Kaoru
Akiyama, 230 P. 2nd 1017, this court laid down the
rule that where a minor disaffirms, he is not required
to restore the merchant to his former position, but is
only required to return that part of his take that still
remains in his hands. The evidence here shows that defendant took the trailer house back and sold it and gave
plaintiff credit on his books. Under the rule in the
above case it is immaterial whether the defendant is
out of pocket any money in connection with the transaction. The only person out of pocket in connection
with the transaction is the plaintiff and the court clearly recognized the lack of evidence in connection with
this matter. I quote from line 16 page 143 of the record as follows:
COURT: I'll have to make a finding that Mr.
Hadfield is out of pocket the thousand dollars
as far as the cash part of it is concerned, by
reason of the depreciation in the sale value of
the equipment. In other UJords, the court is
extending a boon to the defendant. He had a right
to rescind that. He doe8n 't need to buy a mobile
home. I'm not conunanding him to buy a mobile
home. He doesn't need to. I'm not 1nandamusing
him to buy a ne'v mobile hon1e, but I'm saying
Hadfield had better allow him a thousand and
thirty dollars on a ne'Y mobile home if he wants
to go get one. etc.'' (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no evidence of any depreciation in the sale
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value of the mobile home in question, which is attributable to the plaintiff: nor is it material and in any
event. The defendant signed a novation contract or a
contract, himself giving the plaintiff credit for the
total $1,000.00 plus interest, without any mention of
any depreciation in sale price. Defendants own test-

imony sho\v~ no offer of purchase from any other party and in fact shows that business was bad and we can
conclude that he had more mobile homes than he could
sell.
The finding that defendant was out of pocket $1,000.00
is clearly a ''boon'' to the defendant, which finding is
totally unsupported hy any evidence.

POINT NO. 6: THE COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT EACH OF THE ~1:ATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S C 0 M PLAINT
'VERE TRU.E AND RENDERING A MONEY Jt'"DG1\fENT IN PLAINTIFF'S FA\rOR.
The court was quite cognizant that the plaintiff's
allegations were \Yell proven and without dispute, I
quote fro1n the record as follows: P. 127 of the record
line 20:
''So in the light of what I've said . . . and
it's remarkable how three la\vYers can look at
a case from three different angles-the court
finds that each and all the allegations of the
complaint are true, every one of them. I find
that the plaintiff was a minor and is a minor.
I find that the father is the guardian. I find
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that on or about the fifth day of January, 1960
the minor entered into a contract with the defendant for the purchase of a trailer house and
had deposited with the defendant a total sum of
$1,000.00 to apply on the purchase of any trailer
from Hadfield prior to 1 May, 1960, which amount was to draw interest in favor of the plaintiff at the rate of six per cent. I find that the
contract was diaaffirmed.
The court further recognized the error of its decision
and the fact that it was out of line with the law; I quote
from page 144 of the record at the top:
THE COURT: Well, this is a mixed-up decision and it's probably reversible, I invite you
to appeal. That's all right.
CONCLUSION
The undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff deposited $1,000.00 with defendant which the defendant
still holds and plaintiff is not estopped to disaffirm
and effectively disaffirmed any agreement under which
the $1,000.00 is still held and is entitled to a money
judgment for the $1,000.00 plus interest against the
defendant.
Respectfully submitted
DAVID R. DAINES
Attorney for Appellant
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